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Abstract 
 
This study empirically analyzed downward nominal wage rigidity using time-series 
cross-industry data from 1981 to 2002, a period which included deflation. We found 
that nominal wages remained rigid to downward pressure by expected deflation and 
labor-market tightness. Estimations according to worker age categories revealed 
downward wage rigidity with deflationary pressure for most age categories. Wage 
rigidity during labor-market tightness was greater for younger workers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The unemployment rate in Japan has remained high since the late 1990s. One possible 
cause may be downward nominal wage rigidity. Downward rigidity, or “stickiness”, can be 
characterized by the following: (1) nominal wages respond asymmetrically to upward and 
downward pressures, and (2) downward wage adjustments are slower than upward wage 
adjustments. Downward rigidity can remarkably obstruct regulating functions in a labor market 
through nominal wage adjustments and can keep unemployment rates high. Figure 1 illustrates 
the recent sustained deflation in Japan, which should have placed downward pressure on 
nominal wages. Such a situation provides important information on the regulating functions of 
nominal wages. 
Most previous studies on downward nominal wage rigidity have used microdata (e.g., 
McLaughlin, 1994, 1999; Lebow et al., 1995; Card and Hyslop, 1996; Kahn, 1997; Altonji and 
Devereux, 1999; and Kuroda and Yamamoto, 2003a, 2003b). Microdata can help explain 
downward nominal wage rigidity as related to individual workers. However, such data are 
insufficient when discussing downward wage rigidity for the entire labor market. For instance, 
even if an individual’s nominal wage is downwardly rigid, he or she can be replaced with 
another worker of equal ability and lower wage, so that wages are actually downwardly flexible 
for the entire labor market. This replacement effect would not necessarily be obvious through 
observations of individual workers. Therefore, we investigated aggregate data to determine the 
downward flexibility of wages within the overall labor market. 
Two main factors cause nominal wage fluctuations in the labor market: (1) the tightness 
of the labor market and (2) variation of the expected inflation rate, as implied by the 
wage-version Phillips curve. Using this curve as a framework, we analyzed whether nominal 
wages have responded sufficiently to pressures presented by the above factors. 
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We also verified differences in downward rigidity across various age categories. In 
recent years, Japan has witnessed a disparity in unemployment rates by age. Younger workers 
in particular have faced higher unemployment rates. This condition can create serious social 
problems (see figure 2) and may relate to downward nominal wage rigidity. Therefore, we 
examined the existence of more severe downward rigidity in the young-worker labor market. 
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we introduce the wage-version Phillips 
curve and its relevance to this study; in sections 3, 4, and 5, we present estimation equations, the 
data set, and estimation results, respectively. Conclusions are presented in section 6. 
 
 
2. Wage-Version Philips Curve 
 
2.1. Phillips Curve and Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity 
First, we will briefly introduce the Philips curve, which is a key to this study. The 
wage-version Philips curve shows the hyperbolic, inverse relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the rate of nominal wage change. The curve implies that the rate of 
nominal wage change increases as the labor market tightens and falls as the labor market 
loosens. Therefore, this curve characterizes adjustment mechanisms of the economy-wide labor 
market by indicating the trade-off between employment and stable wage changes. 
As Friedman (1968) noted, however, the labor market should be adjusted not by 
nominal wages, but by the real wages, unless workers have monetary illusions. Another 
viewpoint sees the actual Philips curve as shifting with the expected inflation rate, although 
basic Philips curve methods ignore expectation effects. In other words, the unemployment rate 
should be independent of the long-term rate of nominal wage change, which the expected 
inflation rate equates to its actual value. The unemployment rate will then reach a unique value 
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determined by the real factors of labor market. This rate is referred to as the natural rate of 
unemployment. By contrast, in the short term, when the expected inflation rate differs from the 
actual rate, the relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of nominal wage 
change will create a downward-sloping curve for each expected inflation rate. This is called the 
short-run Philips curve. 
Second, the Phillips curve form should be distinguished from a straight line, with the 
focus placed on the curve’s non-zero curvature, as well as its negative slope1. The Phillips 
curve is defined by its appearance, e.g., a steeper slope on the left side of the natural 
unemployment rate and a gentler slope on the opposite side. To understand the ramifications of 
this shape, suppose that the unemployment rate is greater than its natural value. If the slope on 
the right side were nearly equal to that on the left, then the rate of change in the nominal-wage 
would be much smaller than what the actual curve indicates. The labor market would then soon 
adjust without any wage rigidity, and the unemployment rate would decrease and approach its 
natural state. By contrast, downward wage rigidity would cause the wage to behave differently 
once the unemployment rate increased beyond its natural value. For every marginal increase in 
the unemployment rate, the nominal wage would decrease at a much slower rate, below a 
certain value. The slope of the Phillips curve would therefore become much gentler, reflecting 
this relation. In other words, the wage would reflect the nonlinearity of the changing slopes of 
the left- and right-hand areas bounded by the natural unemployment rate. In summary, the 
Phillips curve would have non-zero curvature only if the nominal wage bore the downward 
rigidity. 
 
2.2. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity and Recent Deflation in Japan 
To our knowledge, only Kimura and Ueda (2001) have analyzed the recent nominal 
                                                 
1 Kurosaka and Hamada (1984) and Genda and Kondo (2003) provided similar explanations of this issue. 
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wage rigidity in Japan using aggregate data from the deflationary periods2. They examined the 
nonlinear relation between the actual rate of change in the nominal wage and the “notional” 
rate, derived from the wage-version Phillips curve equation. The nonlinearity was thought to 
result from the disparity between the notional and actual nominal wage change rates if actual 
rates failed to decrease sufficiently to equal the negative, notional values. Conversely, the actual 
rates were assumed to equal the notional rates when both rates were positive and wages were 
going to increase. Consequently, Kimura and Ueda (2001) determined the nominal wage 
downward rigidity defined by the above disparity, using time-series cross-industry data from 
1976 to 1998. By contrast, applying the same method to aggregated time-series data from 1976 
through 2000 failed to confirm downward rigidity throughout the period. Integrating those 
results, they concluded that wages should converge at their equilibrium levels after a time lag, 
although downward rigidity had been temporarily observed because of labor’s monetary 
illusions under unfamiliar zero or negative inflation rates. 
However, two problems from this study must still be solved. First, two different sources 
of downward pressure on wages were combined: the expected inflation rate and the 
unemployment rate. The authors’ conclusions, however, emphasized only the role of the former 
factor in the disappearance of wage rigidity in recent years. Although downward pressure 
exerted by expected deflation began in the late 1990s, they postulated its prevalence before that 
period and paid little attention to how unemployment rates affected nominal wages. That is, the 
downward pressure observed from the time-series cross-industry data until the late 1990s 
should have come solely from an increase in the unemployment rate. Therefore, it is 
                                                 
2 By contrast, many other studies found a nonlinear relation between the labor supply-and-demand situation 
and the rate of nominal-wage change. These studies, such as one by Nishizaki and Watanabe (2000), used 
data from the pre-deflationary period in Japan. However, Nishizaki and Watanabe (2000) has two 
shortcomings. First, their initial estimates were apparently biased by sample selection, depending on 
whether the value of the consumer price index inflation rate, adopted as the dependent variable, was three 
percent or more. Second, subsequent analysis emphasized a slope decrease in linear Phillips curves for a 
few consecutive periods as evidence of the nonlinear relation, although those separately estimated curves 
could have lacked mutual coincidence and thus give only indirect evidence of nonlinearity over the period. 
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problematic to have concluded that a greater familiarity with zero or negative inflation rates 
from 1999 on suddenly enabled the nominal wage to begin adapting flexibly to the expected 
deflation. In principle, it seems misleading to have assumed that the expected inflation rate and 
the unemployment rate exerted equal influence on the actual nominal wages with regard to 
downward rigidity. Our analysis, by contrast, contained no such assumptions. 
Second, as Ohtake (2001) pointed out, Kimura and Ueda (2001) failed to consider the 
effect of substituting part-time workers earning lower wages for better-paid regular employees, 
although that replacement could have hidden persistent rigidity in the nominal wages earned by 
regular workers after 1999. Since Kimura and Ueda’s macro-level aggregated data averaged the 
earnings of regular employees and part-time workers, the nominal wage could have appeared 
flexible in the economy-wide labor market. The examination of downward rigidity requires 
data that identify the wages of only regular employees since 1999. 
To solve these problems, we used time-series cross-industry data to examine the 
behavior of nominal wages in Japan; similar data were also used by Kimura and Ueda (2001), 
but only until 1998, during the period 1981-2002. Our analyses were based primarily on direct 
estimations of the Phillips curve. We were able to identify sources of downward nominal wage 
rigidity using the estimated relation between each explanatory variable and the rate of change in 
the nominal wage. Using this method, nonlinearity of the nominal wage with regard to the 
unemployment rate, one of the explanatory variables, would prove the non-zero curvature of 
the Phillips curve. Similarly, the nonlinearity of nominal wage in regard to the expected 
inflation rate would show downward rigidity in the nominal wage with the expectation that 
such a condition would cause deflationary pressure. Different reactions to inflationary and 
deflationary pressure, implied by the above expectation concerning nonlinearity, would suggest 
asymmetric shifts of the Phillips curve, depending on whether the directions were upward or 
downward. 
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Note that our analysis contains no strong assumption regarding the perfect adjustment 
of nominal wages faced with upward pressure, as was postulated by Kimura and Ueda (2001). 
The estimation, detailed in the next section, had no need for such an assumption because it 
tested nonlinear influences directly (i.e., the expected inflation rate and unemployment rate) on 
the nominal wage. Note also that the remaining part of this paper adopts the following criterion 
for determining the existence of nominal wage rigidity: the response of the nominal wage to 
downward pressure was significantly smaller than its reaction to the upward pressure. The next 
section will describe the specific estimation methods, which were based on the arguments 
presented in the first two sections. 
 
 
3. Specifications 
 
First, we postulated a basic Phillips-curve-type equation (1) with the rate of change in 
the nominal wage as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables , , and  denote 
the expected inflation rate, unemployment rate, and industry-specific shock measured by the 
rate of change in the industrial real GDP, respectively: 
e
tπ tU tiy ,
 
tiititt
e
ti ucyUw ,,11, ++++= γβαπ . (1) 
 
Kimura and Ueda (2001) also used these specifications to explain the rate of nominal wage 
change in the absence of nominal-wage downward rigidity. In the above equation, the expected 
inflation coefficient  should be positive, and the unemployment rate coefficient  should be 
negative. Furthermore,  is thought to be unity if the nominal wage has no downward rigidity 
with deflationary pressure. 
1α 1β
1α
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The sign of the industry-specific shock coefficient γ can be either positive or negative. 
That effect is predictable as long as the nominal wage behavior coincides with the real wage 
through perfect correspondence with the expected inflation rate. For example, the coefficient 
representing the real GDP of each industry, γ, has to be positive when real wages are 
procyclical. For counter-cyclical behavior in the real wage, γ should be negative. Literature on 
the relationship between the real wage and the business cycle provides insight into the influence 
of each industry’s business cycle. An array of related empirical research has found both signs of 
the γ coefficient, and both possible effects have been theoretically supported by many other 
studies3 .Recent works by Sumner and Silver (1989) and Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) 
pointed out the correspondence between the inflation rate and real-wage responses to the 
business cycle. That is, when the former moved procyclically, the latter changed 
counter-cyclically and vice versa. As indicated in Figure 3, the inflation rate moved 
procyclically during the observation period in this study; Therefore, γ was assumed to be 
negative as long as α1 equaled unity. However, γ could be positive or negative if α1 differed 
from unity due to nominal wage rigidity. 
 
tiititt
e
tt
e
ti ucyUdw ,,121, +++++= γβαα ππ  (2) 
 
Equation (2) also adds an interaction term between the expected inflation  and the 
dummy variable , which indicates whether the expected inflation rate is below zero. Adding 
this variable enabled us to examine the symmetry of the nominal wage response to any 
downward or upward pressure by the inflation rate. In other words, downward wage rigidity 
would be confirmed if the coefficient  in the interaction between the deflationary dummy 
e
tπ
td
2α
                                                 
3 Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) reviewed these studies particularly. 
7 
td and the expected inflation  was estimated to be significantly negative and sufficiently 
large in absolute value to eliminate the effect of . In addition, the unemployment rate 
coefficient  was expected to be negative; the industry-specific shock coefficient γ was 
deemed unpredictable using the same argument given in specification (1). 
e
tπ
1α
1β
 
tiiti
t
t
e
ti ucyU
w ,,21,
1 ++++= γβαπ  (3) 
 
Equation (3) replaced the unemployment rate variable  with its inverse. If that 
specification had a higher goodness-of-fit index score than that from equation (1), the response 
of the nominal wage to the unemployment rate should be regarded as non-linear rather than 
linear. The nonlinearity implies the different slopes of the Phillips curve in the left and right 
areas divided by the natural unemployment rate. Further, nonlinearity provides evidence of 
wage rigidity against the downward pressure generated by looseness in the economy-wide labor 
market, as discussed previously. In addition, stronger nonlinearity should lead to a greater value 
for the inverted unemployment rate coefficient . Using the same argument used for equation 
(1),  was expected to be positive, and γ estimations were unpredictable a priori. 
tU
2β
1α
 
tiiti
t
t
e
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e
ti ucyU
dw ,,221,
1 +++++= γβαα ππ  (4) 
 
Equation (4) addresses not only the symmetry of effects from both positive and negative 
expected inflation rates, but also the non-linear influence of the unemployment rate. 
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4. Data and Expected Inflation Rate 
 
Our analyses primarily used industry-specific time-series data concerning changes in 
the nominal wage and industry-specific shock measured by the rate of change. Kimura and 
Ueda (2001) used a similar method. Our estimation, based on time-series cross-industry data, 
also used macroeconomic data on expected inflation and unemployment rates. We used 
averaged wage data and wage data classified into five groups based on worker age: 15-24, 
25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55 and over4. Descriptions of the data sources and variables follow. 
First, the nominal wages were evaluated using hourly wages including bonuses 
calculated from data on “contractual cash earnings”, “annual special cash earnings”, “annual 
number of scheduled hours worked”, and “annual number of overtime worked”. These data 
categories were created from the definitions provided in the Basic Survey on Wage Structure or 
the so-called The Japanese Wage Census.  
Second, based on the static expectation, the inflation rate of each prior year was adopted 
as a proxy for the expected inflation, as in Kimura and Ueda (2001). We chose this expectation 
based on an examination of adaptive expectation. The “short-cut method” was used to obtain 
the worst fitness for models with larger numbers of lagged variables5. The best fitness was 
marked only when the one-term lag was thought to have explained the expectation. The results 
should justify the use of static expectation and the exclusion of adaptive expectation. Kitamura 
et al. (2003) and Genda and Kondo (2003) also noted that adaptive expectation poorly 
                                                 
4 See the appendix for details on the data for each age category. 
5 The short-cut method regresses lagged explanatory variables with linearly decreasing weights for longer 
time lags and clarifies the optimal number of such variables with regard to the goodness of fit. Specifically, 
the weight for the ith term is defined as [ ]2/)1(/)1( +−+= mmimwi , where m signifies the maximum 
degree of lag. Each explanatory variable has the following weighted average  for a particular m. 
The simple regression of X
∑
=
−
m
i
iti Xw
1
t using the above regressors indicates the optimal degree of m, introducing the 
model with the highest fitness. 
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explained the expected inflation rate in their research on a non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU) Phillips curve in which the inflation rate was the dependent variable. 
The inflation rate was represented by the GDP deflator in the Annual Report on National 
Accounts, as used by Kimura and Ueda (2001)6. 
Third, each annual unemployment rate used here equaled the “ratio of unemployed in 
the labor force” as given in the Monthly Report on the Labor Force Survey. The 
industry-specific shock was evaluated using the rate of change reported in the “Gross domestic 
product classified by economic activities (2001-)” or the “Gross domestic product by kind of 
economic activity (1980-2000)” publications in the Annual Report on National Accounts. Data 
were collected for 1981 through 2002 for 25 industries7. Descriptive statistics are given in the 
appendix. 
 
 
5. Response of the Nominal Wage Rate of Change 
 
5.1. Estimated Results using Averaged Data for all Regular Employees 
Using the average wage for all age groups, pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), random 
effect (RE), and fixed effect (FE) estimators were obtained from regression equations (1) 
through (4). The Breusch-Pagan test rejected the null hypothesis of zero variance for fixed 
effects for all the equations at the 5% significance level. Consequently, the pooled OLS model 
could be rejected for all of the models. The Hausman tests did not reject the null hypothesis 
(i.e., no correlation between the fixed effect and explanatory variables) for any of the regression 
                                                 
6 The use of the CPI, instead of the GDP deflator, did not affect our conclusions. Since the absolute values of 
the CPI during the deflationary period were smaller than those of the GDP deflator, a significant change was 
observed only in the absolute value of the interaction term between the expected inflation and the 
deflationary dummy. 
7 See the appendix for industry classifications. The study period (1981 to 2002) was limited due to the 
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equations, even at the 10% significance level. Therefore, the RE model was adopted. Its 
estimation results are briefly explained below and summarized in Table 1. 
Model (1) produced a positive value for the expected inflation coefficient α1; however, 
its level differed substantially from unity, indicating that wages did not fully behave as real 
wages. The effects of unemployment (β1) and industry-specific shock (γ) were estimated to be 
negative. The latter, showing the negative but insignificant influences of industrial GDP, were 
also confirmed by specifications (2), (3), and (4). 
Second, the interaction term between the deflationary dummy and expected inflation 
produced a significantly negative estimated α2 by equation (2). Moreover, the marginal effect of 
expected inflation (α1) approached unity more closely than α1 in model (1). The absolute value 
of estimated α2 was large enough to eliminate the effect of expected inflation (α1); this result 
showed that wages had not responded to deflation pressure. In other words, while positive 
inflation was expected, the wages behaved as a real variable to a certain degree in response to 
real economic factors. Conversely, wage behavior showed downward rigidity with expected 
deflation and therefore played an insufficient role as a labor-market adjustment factor. 
Third, the estimation results from models (1) and (3) indicated a higher significance of 
β2 in (3) than β1 in (1) and a higher coefficient of determination from (3) than from (1). Model 
(3) estimated coefficient β2 from the inverse of the unemployment rate as an explanatory 
variable, while model (1) evaluated β1 based on the unemployment rate itself. Hence, the wage 
change should have reacted non-linearly rather than linearly to the unemployment rate. There 
should have been downward rigidity in the nominal wage change with a real factor, i.e., the 
labor supply-and-demand situation. The same point can be drawn from comparing the results of 
(2) and (4). From regression (4), however, the estimated expected inflation coefficient (α1) was 
far from unity, and the counterpart of the interaction term (α2) had a smaller absolute value. This 
                                                                                                                                                        
availability of real GDP data for each industry at the time of writing. 
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result might reflect a possible correlation between expected inflation and the unemployment 
rate (U). Introducing the inverse of the latter could weaken the nonlinear influences of those 
two variables. 
A main finding was that the nominal wage made no response to deflationary 
expectations; such rigidity thereby raised the real wage. In other words, the Phillips curve 
shifted upward under such an expectation, although it theoretically should have moved 
downward. Now, it can be shown how the unemployment rate would have behaved if nominal 
wage adjustment had worked under deflation in the same way it changed under inflation. That 
is, the following simple calculation based on the result of (4) can show the hypothetical value of 
U when α2 = 0. We based this simulation on unemployment rates from 1999-2002 because the 
calculation requires a one-period lagged variable of expectation. Recall that the consecutive 
deflationary period began in 1998 and was indexed by the GDP deflator. The average inflation 
from 1998 to 2001 equaled –1.265%; the coefficient of interaction between the deflationary 
dummy and expected inflation (α2) was estimated to be –1.476. Therefore, the Phillips curve 
should have, on average, shifted downward by 1.867% (= 1.265–1.476) during the period. Any 
downward shift of a negatively sloped Phillips curve would reduce the unemployment if the 
identical rate of nominal wage change were then realized. Second, the mean unemployment rate 
(U) for 1999-2002 was 4.95%, while the estimated coefficient of the inverse of U equaled 
24.723. The U* denoted the unemployment rate without wage rigidity. Then, the following 
equality could be derived from model (4): (1/4.95) × 24.723 + 1.867 = (1/ U*) × 24.723. The 
equation revealed that U* = 3.60%. Since the above procedure was based roughly on the 
wage-unemployment correlation underpinning the Phillips curve, room was left for 
improvement, such as dynamic modeling of the process. 
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5.2. Estimation Results for Each Age Group 
This section examines the estimations for each age group. The Breusch-Pagan and 
Hausman tests were applied to equations (1) through (4) for every age category, as in the 
previous estimations. The former test rejected the null hypothesis of zero fixed-effect variance 
about all age groups, but model (4) revealed a 5% significance level for the 55-and-over age 
category. Nevertheless, the p-value in that exceptional case did not exceed 0.0501. By contrast, 
the latter test never rejected the hypothesis that the fixed effect is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables even at the 10% significance level. The RE estimation was then applied 
to every age class; tables 2 through 6 show the outcomes. 
The model (2) results for each age category resulted in a significantly negative 
coefficient for the interaction between the deflation dummy and expected inflation α2; the wage 
showed downward rigidity with deflation. Except for the 25-34 age category, the results also 
showed that the influence of expected inflation α1 tended to approach unity much more closely 
than the α1 estimated for all age groups. The coefficients for the 45-54 and 55-and-older age 
categories were especially close to unity: 0.877 and 0.893, respectively. Testing the null 
hypothesis that estimates would equal one revealed p-values of 0.324 and 0.506, respectively. 
This result implies that the nominal wage responded somewhat flexibly to expected prices 
when positive inflation was predicted. The data were separated by age groups to clarify the 
theoretical relationship between the nominal wage and expected inflation for each age group. 
By model (4) the coefficient representing the interaction between the deflation dummy 
and expected inflation, , was significantly negative for all age categories except the 
55-and-older category; this indicates downward wage rigidity with deflation. The deflation rate 
coefficient α
t
e
td π
1 was far from unity with weaker non-linearity than that estimated using the 
averaged total for all age groups. Here, the insignificant estimate for the 55-and-older category 
could indicate flexible adjustment of the nominal wage during the deflationary period, as 
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opposed to the contradictory result obtained by model (2) and described above. Considering 
these two opposite effects, no decisive argument can be derived concerning this age group. 
The replacement of explanatory variable U, the unemployment rate, with its inverse 
value improved the performance of the estimation models. Comparing the R2uared and t-value 
on each regressor between the results from models (3) and (1), the estimates using (3) were 
higher than those using (1) for most age groups. Similar results were obtained on comparing 
specifications (4) and (2). While equations (1) and (2) included the unemployment rate U itself 
as an explanatory variable, (3) and (4) used its inverse value. The same findings were obtained 
for all age groups. However, for the 55-and-older category, the performance of (3) was poorer 
than that of (1); similarly, model (4) performed worse than (2). Therefore, the possibility of 
downward rigidity with unemployment rate could almost be ignored for that age category. 
Table 7 contrasts the estimated inverse unemployment rate (β2) coefficients for all age 
categories. Greater values indicate stronger nonlinearity of the nominal wage with the 
unemployment rate. The results from both (3) and (4) show large estimated values for the 15-24 
age bracket, but small values for the 35-44 and 45-54 age categories. These results suggest 
stronger downward rigidity for workers aged 15 to 24, which can be considered a reason for the 
recent rise in unemployment among young workers. The effects of downward rigidity on 
unemployment in the 55-and-over category can be regarded as linear, as mentioned above, 
although the corresponding estimates were greater than those for the 35-44 and 45-54 age 
categories. 
Strong wage rigidity for those aged 15-24 was confirmed by the higher inverted 
unemployment rate coefficient; this result might be explained by a greater proportion of 
workers in their early 20s, as opposed to those under age 19. In other words, the increasing 
sample weight for the early 20s of relatively higher wages could have raised the mean wage for 
the 15-24 age groups and caused the mean wage to appear rigid. To examine this possibility, we 
14 
analyzed younger-worker subcategories as follows. First, the 15-24 age category was divided 
into the three age subcategories: 15-16, 17-18, and 19-248. Second, regression analyses for the 
three categories were carried out using the processes described above. Model (3) estimated the 
inverse unemployment rates as 57.759, 28.781, and 41.796, respectively, for each group; model 
(4) provided estimates of 57.920, 34.397, and 41.839. These estimates were greater than those 
for the same coefficient estimated for groups aged 25 and over (Figure 7). This result proves the 
stronger downward rigidity for all three under-24 subgroups. Thus, the greater numbers of 
workers in their early 20s in the Japanese labor market is not the reason for the nominal wage 
rigidity in the wages of the 15-24 age groups, contrary to the suggested alternative. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This study examined downward nominal wage rigidity using data from Japan observed 
during a period that included deflationary periods. Estimates were based on time-series 
cross-industry data from 1981 to 2002. We found that nominal wages were rigid to downward 
pressure by both expected deflation and the unemployment rate. Estimates for each age 
category confirmed the existence of downward rigidity to deflationary pressure in all the 
groups, although rigidity for the 55-and-older category was ambiguous. Considering those 
effects, it can be concluded that mild inflation is preferable from the standpoint of labor market 
adjustments. Moreover, the nominal wages for workers in younger age categories were found to 
be more downwardly rigid to the real pressure of the unemployment rate. Therefore, downward 
rigidity likely contributed to rising youth unemployment in recent years. Further study using 
dynamic analysis should examine the extent to which downward rigidity has raised the 
                                                 
8 This classification follows that adopted by the Basic Survey on Wage Structure. 
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unemployment rate. 
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Figure1 Trends in the Inflation Rate 
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Figure 2 Trends in the Unemployment Rate by Age Categories 
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Figure 3 Procyclicality of the Inflation Rate 
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Table 1 Estimation Results using the Average Wage Total for all Age Groups 
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   
Expected Inflation 0.376  *** 0.585 *** 0.115  0.359  *** 
 (0.109)   (0.110)  (0.105)  (0.111)   
Deflation Dummy   -2.004 ***  -1.476  *** 
*Expected Inflation   (0.311)   (0.272)   
Unemployment -1.364  *** -2.039 ***    
 (0.191)   (0.211)     
1/Unemployment    21.436 *** 24.723  *** 
    (2.017)  (2.055)   
Industry-Specific Shock -0.302   -0.971  -0.946  -1.151   
 (1.443)   (1.394)  (1.370)  (1.334)   
Constant 6.604  *** 7.932 *** -4.797 *** -6.616  *** 
 (0.707)   (0.711)  (0.617)  (0.688)   
Number of Observations 525   525  525  525   
R2 0.360  0.408  0.423  0.454    
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
22 
Table 2 Estimation Results for the 15–24 Age Category 
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   
Expected Inflation 0.543 *** 0.661 *** 0.193  0.330 ** 
 (0.117)  (0.119)  (0.124)  (0.129)  
Deflation Dummy   -1.293 ***  -0.967 *** 
*Expected Inflation   (0.318)   (0.282)  
Unemployment -0.636 *** -0.879 ***    
 (0.109)  (0.123)     
1/Unemployment    41.480 *** 46.593 *** 
    (4.802)  (4.982)  
Industry-Specific Shock 1.373  0.914  0.493  0.303  
 (1.453)  (1.436)  (1.407)  (1.394)  
Constant 5.743 *** 6.716 *** -5.148 *** -6.490 *** 
 (0.769)  (0.795)  (0.758)  (0.846)  
Number of Observations 525   525  525  525   
R2 0.393  0.412  0.434  0.447  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3 Estimation Results for the 25-34 Age Category 
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   
Expected Inflation 0.246 ** 0.423 *** -0.172  0.061  
 (0.118)  (0.117)  (0.115)  (0.120)  
Deflation Dummy   -2.022 ***  -1.452 *** 
*Expected Inflation   (0.317)   (0.270)  
Unemployment -1.082 *** -1.643 ***    
 (0.158)  (0.176)     
1/Unemployment    24.944 *** 28.192 *** 
    (2.221)  (2.247)  
Industry-Specific Shock -0.536  -1.401  -1.937  -2.223  
 (1.476)  (1.429)  (1.387)  (1.352)  
Constant 5.680 *** 6.921 *** -5.493 *** -7.169 *** 
 (0.684)  (0.688)  (0.599)  (0.661)  
Number of Observations 525   525  525  525   
R2 0.318  0.368  0.402  0.433   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 4 Estimation Results for the 35-44 Age Category 
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   
Expected Inflation 0.511 *** 0.740 *** 0.172  0.450 *** 
 (0.119)  (0.122)  (0.116)  (0.125)  
Deflation Dummy   -2.077 ***  -1.599 *** 
*Expected Inflation   (0.357)   (0.308)  
Unemployment -1.369 *** -2.301 ***    
 (0.280)  (0.315)     
1/Unemployment    13.447 *** 15.714 *** 
    (1.554)  (1.578)  
Industry-Specific Shock -2.172  -2.871 * -2.899 * -3.065 ** 
 (1.631)  (1.586)  (1.555)  (1.518)  
Constant 4.992 *** 6.245 *** -4.246 *** -6.106 *** 
 (0.743)  (0.752)  (0.671)  (0.746)  
Number of Observations 525   525  525  525   
R2 0.268  0.313  0.331  0.364   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 5 Estimation Results for the 45-54 Age Category 
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   
Expected Inflation 0.600 *** 0.877 *** 0.417 *** 0.713 *** 
 (0.120)  (0.124)  (0.110)  (0.124)  
Deflation Dummy   -2.528 ***  -1.662 *** 
*Expected Inflation   (0.408)   (0.343)  
Unemployment -1.760 *** -2.919 ***    
 (0.273)  (0.323)     
1/Unemployment    11.278 *** 13.251 *** 
    (1.160)  (1.206)  
Industry-Specific Shock 0.041  -0.617  -0.289  -0.403  
 (1.760)  (1.703)  (1.678)  (1.643)  
Constant 5.808 *** 7.155 *** -3.738 *** -5.610 *** 
 (0.672)  (0.685)  (0.569)  (0.678)  
Number of Observations 525   525  525  525   
R2 0.333  0.379  0.390  0.417  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 6 Estimation Results for the 55-and-older Age Category 
   (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   
Expected Inflation 0.669 *** 0.893 *** 0.764 *** 0.914 *** 
 (0.143)  (0.161)  (0.134)  (0.163)  
Deflation Dummy   -1.392 ***  -0.699  
*Expected Inflation   (0.462)   (0.436)  
Unemployment -1.440 *** -1.761 ***    
 (0.243)  (0.264)     
1/Unemployment    19.345 *** 20.507 *** 
    (3.340)  (3.413)  
Industry-Specific Shock -1.483  -1.547  -0.820  -0.758  
 (2.164)  (2.148)  (2.161)  (2.158)  
Constant 8.497 *** 9.124 *** -2.519 *** -3.195 *** 
 (1.087)  (1.099)  (0.831)  (0.931)  
Number of Observations 525   525  525  525   
R2 0.276  0.288  0.274  0.277  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table 7 Comparison of the Inverse Unemployment Rate Coefficients by Age Categories as 
Determined by Equations (3) and (4)  
  15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55-and-older 
(3) 41.480  24.944 13.447 11.278 19.345 
(4) 46.593 28.192 15.714 13.251 20.507 
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Data Appendix 
1. Derivation of Average Wage for Each Age Bracket 
NIKKEI NEEDS data were available in electronic form and provided the unemployment 
rate via a Monthly Report on the Labor Force Survey that included figures classified by five age 
brackets: (1) 15-24, (2) 25-34, (3) 35-44, (4) 45-54, and (5) 55 and older. For comparison, the 
available data on nominal wages from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure were averaged for 12 
age groups: (1) 17 and younger, (2) 18-19, (3) 20-24, (4) 25-29, (5) 30-34, (6) 35-39, (7) 40-44, 
(8) 45-49, (9) 50-54, (10) 55-59, (11) 60-64, and (12) 65 and older. To make these two sources 
of data correspond, the mean wages for the former five groups were calculated, as shown in the 
example below. 
(Example: average wage of the 25-34 age category) 
34302925
3430343029252925
3425
−−
−−−−
− +
×+×=
ll
lwlww  
where jiw − denotes the average wage over the i-j age bracket, and equals the number of 
workers aged between i and j (i < j). 
jil −
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
2. Industry Classifications 
Following the criteria adopted in Kimura and Ueda (2001), Japanese domestic 
industries were categorized according to “major groups” for non-manufacturing and “medium 
groups” for manufacturing as given in the Standard Industrial Classification for Japan. Of the 
categories, those in both the Basic Survey on Wage Structure and Annual Report on National 
Accounts were chosen for our analyses. Those 25 industries were as follows: (1) mining, (2) 
manufacture of food products and beverages (including tobacco and feed), (3) manufacture of 
textile mill products, except apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar 
materials, (4) manufacture of pulp, paper, and paper products, (5) manufacture of chemicals and 
allied products, (6) manufacture of ceramic, stone, and clay products, (7) manufacture of iron 
and steel, (8) manufacture of non-ferrous metals and products, (9) manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, (10) manufacture of general machinery, (11) manufacture of electrical 
machinery, equipment, and supplies, (12) manufacture of transportation equipment, (13) 
manufacture of precision instruments and machinery, (14) manufacture of apparel and other 
finished products made from fabrics and similar materials, (15) manufacture of lumber and 
wood products except furniture, (16) manufacture of furniture and fixtures, (17) publishing, 
printing, and allied industries, (18) manufacture of rubber products, (19) construction, (20) 
electricity, gas, heat supply, and water, (21) wholesale and retail trade, eating and drinking 
establishments, (22) finance and insurance, (23) real estate, (24) transport and communications, 
and (25) services. 
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3. Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. mean S.D. min max 
Rate of change in the nominal  wage 
(overall) 525 2.664 3.167 -10.566 15.755 
Rate of change in the nominal  wage 
(15-24) 525 2.473 3.266 -6.545 13.657 
Rate of change in the nominal  wage 
(25-34) 525 2.033 3.114 -6.035 13.863 
Rate of change in the nominal  wage 
(35-44) 525 2.385 3.347 -8.770 16.552 
Rate of change in the nominal  wage 
(45-54) 525 2.801 3.809 -15.593 22.220 
Rate of change in the nominal  wage 
(55 and older) 525 3.433 4.520 -13.887 22.791 
Expected inflation rate 21 1.009 1.741 -1.990 4.525 
Unemployment rate (overall) 21 3.162 1.017 2.100 5.400 
Unemployment rate (15-24) 21 6.047 1.907 4.350 9.925 
Unemployment rate (25-34) 21 3.592 1.330 2.333 6.467 
Unemployment rate (35-44) 21 2.252 0.751 1.475 4.108 
Unemployment rate (45-54) 21 2.053 0.773 1.217 3.967 
Unemployment rate (55 and older) 21 3.965 1.027 2.442 5.842 
Rate of change in the industrial  real 
GDP 525 0.018 0.080 -0.196 0.535 
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